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In recent years, the standard account of epistemic modal discourse has been criticized 
from two directions. Expressivists and dynamic semanticists argue that simple 
epistemic modal sentences should be understood as non-truth-conditional. Relativists 
hold that the truth values of epistemic modal sentences are determined by the features 
of their contexts of assessment. I argue below that one can integrate the core insights 
of these critical stances without falling into contradiction. 
 
 
Keywords: epistemic modals, non-truth-conditional frameworks, semantic relativism, 
meaning, content, integration  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The dominant view in semantic theory holds that epistemic modals quantify over a set of 
possible worlds that are compatible with a relevant body of knowledge or information. 
Following the terminology introduced by Kratzer (1981, 1991), it is now customary to signify 
this body of knowledge with the term modal base. In standard two-dimensional frameworks, 
epistemic modal bases are represented as independent variables in the meaning of simple 
declarative sentences, usually in the following form: 
 
(1) ⟦might (B) ϕ⟧c,i = 1 iff ∃w' ∈ ⟦B⟧c,i s.t. ⟦ϕ⟧c,w'= 1 
(2) ⟦must (B) ϕ⟧c,i = 1 iff ∀w' ∈ ⟦B⟧c,i s.t. ⟦ϕ⟧c,w'= 1 
 
The first definition states that a sentence ʻIt might be that ϕ’ is true in context ʻc’ just in case 
ʻϕ’, the prejacent, is true at some world in the modal base ʻB’. The second states that a 
sentence ʻIt must be that ϕ’ is true in context ʻc’ just in case the prejacent is true at all worlds 
in the modal base ʻB’.1 These definitions require that the value of the modal base – the set of 
the worlds that are quantified over – be somehow determined.  
There are, in principle, three ways to do this. Modal bases can be determined explicitly by 
attaching restricting clauses to simple modal sentences. Such constructions as ʻGiven what s 
knows, it might be that ϕ’ or ʻIn view of x, it must be that ϕ’ quantify over a restricted set of 
possible worlds. In the first case, ʻmight’ quantifies over the worlds that are compatible with 
the body of knowledge possessed by ʻs’; in the second case, ʻmust’ quantifies over the worlds 
that are compatible with the information state ʻx’ represents. Modal bases can also be 
determined in an implicit way, for example by covert variables in the syntactic structure of 
sentences. If the values of such covert variables are contextually determined sets of possible 
worlds, they can function as restrictors on the quantificational domain of modals. And finally, 
there is a distinctively pragmatic way to impose restrictions on modal bases. Like the referents 
of demonstratives, the set of epistemically relevant worlds can be determined by the domain-
restricting intentions of the speakers. 
The exact nature of these restricting mechanisms is far from clear, and the relationship 
between them is also poorly understood. Let us suppose that there exist covert variables in the 
syntax of modals which govern the restriction of modal bases. Then how can the presence of 
these variables be reconciled with the role of explicit restricting clauses? Or suppose that 
restrictions are governed systematically by speakers’ intentions. If this is so, how can the 
semantic effectiveness of restricting clauses be explained? 
These are vexing questions, but, fortunately, one can understand the theoretical 
significance of the definitions (1) and (2) without knowing all the details of the determination 
of modal bases. It is worth to keep in mind that the dominant view is based on a general 
theory about epistemic modal discourse. The larger picture surrounding (1) and (2) can be 
described as a mixture of semantic and metaphysical theses: 
 
THE TRUTH-CONDITIONAL PICTURE  
(i) Epistemic modals quantify over a suitably restricted set ʻB’ of possible worlds. 
(ii) Simple epistemic modal sentences – like other declarative sentences – express possible 
worlds propositions in their context of occurrence ʻc’. 
(iii) The propositions expressed in ʻc’ serve to represent second-order epistemic facts, and are 
true or false with respect to the index ʻic’. 
 
The semantic part of the truth-conditional picture is rather straightforward: epistemic modal 
sentences express propositions in their contexts of occurrence and these propositions can be 
assessed for truth and falsity at different indices. Epistemically modalized sentences and the 
corresponding non-modal sentences appear to be quite similar in this respect. The 
metaphysical part, however, adds an additional dimension to the customary semantics. It says 
that simple sentences involving ʻmight’ or ʻmust’ have the role of representing second-order 
epistemic facts: speakers who use such sentences under normal circumstances can be seen as 
expressing certain facts pertaining to their own states of mind.
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 On this account, the 
propositional content of the sentence ʻIt might be that ϕ’ is best interpreted as representing a 
certain set of open possibilities which are compatible with the knowledge or information state 
of the speaker. In uttering that sentence, the speaker directs the hearer’s attention to the fact 
that ʻϕ’ is left open by the knowledge or information state she is in. Sentences of the form ʻIt 
must be that ϕ’ have to be interpreted in a parallel manner. 
In the remainder of this paper, I will take it for granted that something like the picture 
consisting of the theses (i)-(iii) above is the basic framework lying behind many 
contemporary accounts of epistemic modals. Such a crude description of THE TRUTH-
CONDITIONAL PICTURE would be inappropriate for many purposes, of course, but all I want to 
do here is to evaluate the prospects for alternative frameworks. In particular, I will consider 
non-truth-conditional and relativist frameworks which accept (i) but reject either (ii) or (iii), 
or both of them. These alternative frameworks are often presented in strong opposition to each 
other, but I will try to show that most of their fundamental insights can be coherently unified 
into a single theory. For simplicity’s sake, I will focus below only on questions that concern 
the formal analysis of might-sentences. 
 
 
2. Arguments for non-truth-conditional theories 
 
A quick reading of the theses (i)-(iii) might lead one to think that epistemic non-modal 
discourse is governed by roughly the same semantic principles as epistemic modal discourse. 
And, indeed, if one disregards the quantificational effects of the modal auxiliary, the meaning 
of (3) and (4) seems to call for the same kind of analysis:
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(3) The keys are on the table. 
(4) The keys might be on the table. 
 
The first step of the analysis establishes the semantic content of these sentences. This is a 
contextually supplied proposition in both cases. Then the second step assigns truth values to 
the contents with respect to the privileged index of the context. There is nothing that could 
block the second step in either case, so both sentences can be analysed as saying something 
that is true or false relative to a particular context-index pair. 
The standard two-step procedure works even if one thinks that (3) and (4) are not equal in 
all respects, since, in contrast to (3), the content of (4) has to reflect somehow the speaker’s 
own state of mind. In this case, one should think of the assignment of truth values to the 
content of (4) as relative to the knowledge or information state of the speaker. Thus the 
privileged world of the index cannot simply be the world of the context in which (4) occurs. 
The natural solution is to introduce a knowledge or information-sensitive variable at the level 
of content, and say that the privileged world varies in accordance with the value of this 
variable. So all that is essential to the analogy between the meaning analysis of the two 
sentences is restored, one just sees that (4) has a slightly more complicated relationship to the 
privileged world of its index than (3). 
Many are of the opinion, however, that epistemically modalized sentences cannot so easily 
be harmonized with their corresponding non-modal sentences. The main target of the criticism 
is thesis (ii). Simple might-sentences do not belong to the category of declaratives – so the 
criticism goes –, because they do not serve to make genuine assertions about the world or to 
state facts. This kind of objection seems to be supported by a powerful intuition which has its 
roots in the discursive practices of ordinary language users. Speakers employ might-sentences  
typically in epistemically incomplete situations. When it is commonly known for every 
participant of a given conversation that it is actually the case that ʻϕ’, then it would be quite 
improper and unreasonable for someone to say that ʻIt might be that ϕ’. One can talk properly 
about ϕ-possibilities only in situations where there is at least one participant in the 
conversation who is not in a position to know whether or not ʻϕ’. Most frequently, of course, 
the ignorant participant is the speaker herself. This suggests that in using might-sentences 
speakers do not have, and cannot have, the aim of describing how things in the world are. 
If this intuitive idea is on the right track, then thesis (ii) can be regarded as false: 
epistemically modalized sentences do not have fact-stating propositions as their contents, and, 
as a consequence, their meaning cannot readily be explained in terms of standard truth-
conditional semantics.  
 There are two ways in which this intuitive idea can be made precise. One option is to 
adopt a dynamic framework for the analysis of epistemic modal discourse. The dynamic 
framework does not assign a radically new semantic function to modal auxiliaries. ʻMight’ 
should still be interpreted as some sort of quantifier over a contextually relevant body of 
knowledge or information. Thesis (i) is thus preserved.
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 The significant difference appears in 
the manner in which the notion of sentential content is defined. In truth-conditional semantics 
might-sentences are supposed to represent (second-order) epistemic facts. Given that facts are 
usually thought of as true propositions and propositions are, in turn, viewed as contents, one 
can reasonably conclude that might-sentences are endowed with truth-evaluable contents. 
Dynamic semantics proposes a different route for constructing sentential contents. The 
basic idea is that epistemic modal sentences acquire content through the contribution they 
make to the context in which they occur. Or, as Willer (2013) formulates it, might-sentences 
have content in virtue of their context change potential. In a dynamic setting, however, the 
conversational contribution of epistemic modal claims should not be equated with something 
that has a propositional structure, and so it cannot be the kind of thing that can be evaluated 
for truth and falsity. The two-dimensional analysis of meaning takes therefore the following 
form:  
 
(5) ⟦might (B) ϕ⟧c,w = {∃w' ∈ ⟦(B)⟧c,w s.t. w' ↑ ϕ  ≠ ∅}    
 
In (5), ʻw’ stands for the set of informational or knowledge states that are compatible with ʻB’ 
in ʻc’, and ↑ denotes the updating effect of ʻϕ’ on ʻw’ in ʻc’. The definition simply states that 
ʻw’ can be successfully updated with ʻϕ’ only in cases where there is at least one 
informational or knowledge state ʻw'’ which does not rule out the possibility of ʻϕ’. This may 
sound like old news, but what is noteworthy in (5) is that it establishes a close connection 
between the meaning of might-sentences and the effects of updating processes. More 
precisely, the notion of sentential meaning is explained here on the basis of these dynamic 
conversational processes, without any recourse to such truth-evaluable semantic entities as 
representations or propositions. It is therefore not really surprising that proponents of the 
dynamic framework reject both thesis (ii) and thesis (iii). 
A second option for precisifying the intuitive idea is to apply an expressivist framework in 
the analysis of epistemic modals. Expressivists agree with the basic statement of the 
Kratzerian view, and like many others they claim that ʻmight’ functions semantically as an 
existential quantifier. Consequently, they regard thesis (i) as adequate.
5 
The agreement ends here, however, because expressivists deny that in real communicative 
situations epistemically modalized sentences are used for representing some features of 
external reality. Instead, they think that such sentences are used primarily for signaling the 
speaker’s own cognitive state. According to Schnieder (2010) and Yalcin (2011), the 
epistemic modal claim ʻIt might be that ϕ’ signals that the speaker regards the prejacent as an 
open possibility. Or, to say the same thing in a slightly different way: it makes manifest that 
the speaker is interested in ʻϕ’, and she does not know that ʻnot-ϕ’ is the case.6 
This imposes at least two criteria on the correct use of epistemic modals: first, the speaker 
must be in a certain cognitive state with respect to the prejacent, and second, she must have 
the appropriate intention to express her own cognitive state. If these criteria are satisfied, then 
the speaker’s speech act can be considered as rationally acceptable. This is an important point. 
It shows that epistemic modal claims are acceptable even if they do not have truth-conditions 
in the traditional sense of the term. Expressivists can integrate these insights into their two-
dimensional framework in the manner of (6): 
 
(6) ⟦might (B) ϕ⟧c,i = 1 iff ∃w' ∈ ⟦B⟧c,i s.t. ⟦ϕ⟧c,w'= 1, but ⟦might ϕ⟧c,w
c
 = {∅} 
 
The essential part in (6) is ⟦might ϕ⟧c,w
c
 = {∅}. It indicates that the context of a might-sentence 
must be conceived formally as a non-factual parameter. What is expressed in ʻc’ is therefore 
something that is not factual. It is a kind of content which cannot be assessed for truth and 
falsity at the world ʻwc’ of ʻc’. But, as the left-hand side of (6) shows, expressivists 
acknowledge a second kind of content. The thought is that epistemic modal discourse would 
be irrational, if might-sentences were completely devoid of truth-conditional content. Thus, at 
least at the discursive level of content, epistemic modal claims are treated by expressivists as 
truth-apt.
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 This half-hearted rehabilitation of truth-conditional content, however, should not 
obscure the main point here, which is that thesis (ii) and thesis (iii) are both false in the 
expressivist framework. The former is false because sentential contents are regarded as non-
factual. The latter is false for the same reason, and additionally because might-sentences are 
taken to express first-order cognitive states. 
Let us take stock. First, we have introduced THE TRUTH-CONDITIONAL PICTURE as the 
most popular framework for formalizing the meaning of simple epistemic modal sentences. 
The theoretical basis of this picture was represented with theses (i) to (iii). Then we have 
briefly reviewed two alternative frameworks. A common feature of these alternatives was that 
they accepted thesis (i) but rejected thesis (ii) and thesis (iii). The key intuition behind this 
theoretical move was that epistemically modalized sentences have a kind of content that 
cannot be evaluated for truth and falsity. 
One obvious problem with non-truth-conditional frameworks is that they are not 
particularly well-suited for explaining compositional phenomena. Let us consider a few 
representative examples: 
 
(7) The keys might be in the car.  
(8) a. Clyde thinks that the keys might be in the car. 
 b. Bonnie believes that the keys might be in the car. 
 c. Clyde: The keys might be in the car. Bonnie: That is false, they cannot be there. 
 
(8) illustrates that (7) embeds under factive and non-factive attitude verbs and negation quite 
naturally.
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 But if might-sentences have no truth-conditional content, then it is hard to explain 
why the complex sentences in (8) seem to be truth-conditional. Examples of this type could be 
easily multiplied. 
It is understandable that those who are committed to the denial of thesis (ii) tend to inflate 
the importance of the standard notion of content. Unfortunately, this manoeuvre results in a 
difficult position. On the one hand, one has to maintain that might-sentences do not describe 
facts and so they lack propositional content. On the other hand, one must acknowledge that 
they may be embedded in larger structures which are designed to describe facts.  
Dynamic semanticists attempt to resolve this tension by altering the semantics of attitude 
verbs. According to Willer (2013), attitude verbs do not denote propositional attitudes; rather 
they denote relations between speakers and context change potentials. If a speaker thinks or 
believes that the keys might be in the car, the attitude verb eliminates all epistemic 
possibilities from her current knowledge or information state in which the keys are not in the 
car. Embedded occurrences of might-sentences are thus explained in terms of context change 
potentials. At first sight, this appears to be a good strategy for evading the questions of truth-
conditional content.  
There exist a couple of problems with this solution, though. I would like to mention here 
only one of them. Some attitude verbs are incompatible with false sentences: one can believe 
that 1 = 2, but one cannot know that 1 = 2. The context change potential of the embedded 
(false) sentence is the same in both cases. It narrows down the set of open possibilities of the 
context by excluding all those worlds in which 1 ≠ 2. Now, it might be asked, how can there 
be a difference between believing and knowing that 1 = 2 without there being a difference in 
the context change potential of the (false) sentence ʻ1 = 2’. The standard explanation is 
straightforward: ʻ1 = 2’ expresses a false proposition; and while there is no in-principle 
barrier to believe false propositions, one cannot know what is false. This kind of explanation 
is not available to dynamic semanticists, since they are debarred from applying the notion of 
propositional content. But it is not entirely clear how an alternative explanation could be 
provided for the difference between believing and knowing false propositions. 
Expressivists are faced with the same sort of problem. They have to explain how might-
sentences can be embedded in truth-conditional constructions without using the standard 
notion of content. As we have seen, expressivists try to reserve a place for truth-conditional 
content at the discursive level of language use.
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 It might be objected, however, that instead of 
providing a real solution, this move only displaces the original problem to a higher level. 
What are exactly the semantic mechanisms which make might-sentences truth-evaluable at the 
discursive level? And how can these mechanisms be formally represented? Expressivists, like 
Yalcin or Schnieder, have not yet provided a detailed and definitive answer to these questions.  
 
 
3. The relativist alternative 
 
In contrast to the proponents of dynamic and expressivist theories, semantic relativists do not 
have principled objections to thesis (ii).
10
 Much work of relativists, such as Lasersohn (2011) 
and MacFarlane (2011, 2012), insist that might-sentences express truth-evaluable content in 
their context of occurrence. So they can explain in a straightforward way how and why 
epistemically modalized sentences interact with other truth-conditional expressions. 
However, in spite of the acceptance of thesis (ii) (and thesis (i)), there is a major point of 
disagreement between semantic relativism and THE TRUTH-CONDITIONAL PICTURE. 
MacFarlane (2011) provides an interesting set of linguistic data to show why THE TRUTH-
CONDITIONAL PICTURE cannot be correct as it stands.
11
 These data concern the use of might-
sentences in everyday conversational situations. For example, speakers sometimes are forced 
to retract their prior might-claim in a posterior situation, even if they think that the claim was 
legitimate:  
 
(9) a. Clyde: The keys might be in the car. 
 b. Bonnie: No, they cannot be there. You had left them on the kitchen table. 
 c. Clyde: Okay, then I was wrong. 
 
Clyde retracts his claim after he has learned from Bonnie that the keys are on the kitchen 
table. This does not mean, however, that he should regard his original claim as illegitimate. 
Quite the contrary, he might think that the prejacent of the asserted sentence was not ruled out 
by anything he knew at that time. 
It may also happen that speakers and hearers take different attitudes to a certain might-
claim in the same conversational context. Consider the following eavesdropping situation: 
 
 (10) a. Clyde (muttering for himself): The keys might be in the car. 
 b. Bonnie (sitting in the neighbor room): No, they cannot be there. They are in my  
    pocket. 
 
Adherents of THE TRUTH-CONDITIONAL PICTURE assume that the truth values of epistemically 
modalized sentences are fixed in their context of occurrence absolutely. This is why examples 
like (9) and (10) present difficulties for them. Taken together, (9a) and (9c) are problematic 
because they assign different truth values to one and the same might-claim in different 
contexts. (10a) and (10b) are similarly puzzling because they assign different truth values to a 
certain might-claim in the same context. 
In order to dissolve the problems posed by (9) and (10), semantic relativists propose to 
assign truth values to epistemically modalized sentences only relative to their contexts of 
assessment. According to relativists, Clyde may regard his own claim as true, if he assesses it 
in its original context (9a), but he may reject it as false when he is placed in the epistemically 
enriched context (9c). The mini-dialogue in (10) can be explained in an analogous fashion. 
One should only take into account that truth value assignments can vary freely across the 
cognitive perspectives of speakers: although Clyde and Bonnie disagree about the truth value 
of the sentence ʻThe keys might be in the car’, both of them are right from their own 
perspective. 
As these examples indicate, the main point of the relativist proposal concerns the question 
of the assignment of truth values to sentential contents. Truth-conditional frameworks agree 
that might-sentences have to be evaluated for truth and falsity with respect to epistemically 
relevant worlds. But how are these worlds to be determined?  
Thesis (iii) states, as we have seen, that the privileged worlds for truth value evaluation are 
initialized by the features of the contexts in which might-sentences occur. According to 
MacFarlane and other relativists, contexts of occurrence have no role beyond determining 
sentential contents. Of course, sentential contents must be determined before any evaluation is 
attempted, but it is always the context of assessment which is responsible for truth value 
assignments. For this reason, the meaning of might-sentences is formalized within the 
relativist framework as follows: 
 
(11) ⟦might (B) ϕ⟧c⟨a,i⟩ = 1 iff ∃wa ∈ ⟦B⟧c⟨a,i⟩ s.t. ⟦ϕ⟧a,w
a
 = 1, 
 
where contexts of assessment are designated by the upper index ʻa’. Note that (11) yields 
theoretically interesting results only in cases where ʻc ≠ a’. If ʻc = a’, that is, the context of 
occurrence of a might-sentence is identical with its context of assessment, then (11) produces 
the same result as (1). In such cases, the relativist framework does not differ significantly 
from other truth-conditional frameworks.  
 
 
4. A digression on the semantic relevance of dialogic interactions 
 
In his groundbreaking work on the semantics of context-sensitive expressions, David Kaplan 
has made the following remark: “Logic and semantics are concerned not with the vagaries of 
actions, but with the verities of meanings.”12 Actions like uttering or understanding words and 
sentences are external to the formal dimension of meaning. Actions take time, are 
idiosyncratic and unrepeatable, and for this reason they cannot be used as input to formal 
models of logic and semantics. Kaplan argued, rather convincingly, that the proper objects of 
semantic theories are not utterances, but sentences as they occur in contexts. What applies to 
actions applies also to contetxs: it would be a mistake to treat contexts as concrete situations 
where dialogic interactions take place. Contexts should instead be interpreted as sequences of 
parameters which are needed to fix the denotations of various context-sensitive expressions. 
According to the Kaplanian approach, contexts could be represented by quintuples of the form 
<s, t, l, w, g>, where ʻs’ is a speaker, ʻt’ is a point of time, ʻl’ is a location, ʻw’ is a possible 
state of the world, and ʻg’ is a (possibly partial) variable assignment function defined on the 
salient entities of ʻw’ at ʻt’ and ʻl’. 
Many semanticists believe, at least in the formal camp, that such a methodological purism 
pays off, if the central goal of semantics is to provide truth-conditions for the sentences of a 
given language. As a corollary of this view, one obtains a familiar division of labor between 
semantics and pragmatics: while semantics explores verities of meanings, pragmatics 
investigates what speakers are doing when they make utterances in concrete situations of 
language use. 
Methodological purism relegates dialogic interactions to the realm of pragmatics. The case 
of epistemic modals shows, however, that this judgement needs certain qualification. 
Dialogues in which simple epistemic modal sentences are used produce some effects that are 
not purely pragmatic. One obvious example is when truth value assignments vary across the 
cognitive perspectives of speakers. If such pragmatic factors as speakers’ perspectives are 
indeed relevant for the truth-evaluation of might-sentences, then one has to choose between 
two options. One option is to relax the strict standards of methodological purism. Perhaps 
some kinds of action may yet serve as inputs to formal semantics. Another option is to 
supplement the Kaplanian notion of context with additional parameters. Perhaps contexts can 
be thought of as sixtuples of the form <s, t, l, w, g, p>, where ʻp’ denotes the cognitive 
perspective of ʻs’. Both of these options have their own merits and limitations, but I do not 
want to pursue the issue further here. 
 
 
5. A strategy of integration 
 
Having made these important side points, let us now turn back to our main theme. It is clear 
from the foregoing that non-truth-conditional and relativist frameworks are in conflict with 
each other because of their opposing relation to thesis (ii). This is bad news for those who 
consider both frameworks as providing a promising alternative to THE TRUTH-CONDITIONAL 
PICTURE. One may think that non-truth-conditional approaches are correct in claiming that 
simple might-sentences do not have or express truth-evaluable contents. This claim seems to 
have considerable intuitive support. On the other hand, the relativist framework seems to offer 
a properly general and plausible solution to the problems posed by compositional and 
conversational phenomena. 
Although the incompatibility between these types of frameworks is pretty obvious, I think 
that there is a possible strategy for their integration. The core insight is that, with some 
reservations, one can reject and accept thesis (ii) simultaneously.  
First, let us see how to reject it. Recall that according to thesis (ii), a simple epistemic 
modal sentence expresses a possible worlds proposition in its context of occurrence. If this is 
taken to mean that the expressed proposition determines automatically its truth conditions, 
then it strikes me as false. Thesis (ii) does not entail thesis (iii). For the sake of illustration, 
consider the following sentence as it occurs in ʻc’: 
 
(12) The keys might be on the kitchen table. 
 
Suppose, as many would agree, that (12) expresses the proposition that the keys might be on 
the kitchen table.
13
 Then this proposition is the semantic content of (12) in ʻc’. But it does not 
follow that there is also a privileged world necessarily associated with ʻc’. Rather, it is more 
plausible to say that ʻc’ is associated with a choice set of worlds {wc, wc’,  wc’’, …} which does 
not contain any privileged element. The size of this set can be conceived as dependent on the 
features of the modal base ʻB’ of ʻc’: it increases or decreases as the body of knowledge or 
information contained in ʻB’ increases or decreases.  
However, the more important observation is that there is no chance in ʻc’ for selecting one 
particular world from the choice set {w
c
, w
c’,  w
c’’, …} against which the semantic content of 
(12) could be evaluated for truth and falsity. Given that the standard two-dimensional analysis 
sees nothing in ʻc’ that could be able to trigger the selection of such a world, the content of 
(12) may justly be regarded as non-truth-evaluable. Viewed from this perspective, thesis (ii) 
appears to be false. 
Now, let us see why thesis (ii) may nevertheless be considered to be acceptable. The idea is 
this: (12) has a truth-evaluable content in its context of occurrence ʻc’ only if it is assessed 
from a context ʻa’ that is able to select a particular world from the choice set of ʻc’. For 
example, if it is common knowledge in ʻa’ that the keys are on the kitchen table, then the 
content of (12) is true in ʻc’ as assessed from ʻa’. On the other hand, if it is common 
knowledge in ʻa’ that the keys are in the car, then the content of (12) is false in ʻc’ as assessed 
from ʻa’.  
To avoid a misunderstanding, let us emphasize that it is not the truth value of a prior might-
sentence which is assumed to vary across different contexts of assessment. Instead, the 
variability has to be located in the selection of truth conditions: might-sentences are associated 
with a choice set of worlds in their context of occurrence and different contexts of assessment 
select different worlds from this set. The main point of these observations can be represented 
formally as follows:   
 
(13) ⟦might (B) ϕ⟧c⟨a,i⟩ = 1 iff ∃wc ∈ ⟦B⟧c⟨a,i⟩ s.t. a → wc and ⟦ϕ⟧c,w
c
 = 1, but ⟦might ϕ⟧c,w
c
 
= {∅} 
 
In (13), ʻa → wc’ means that the world ʻwc’ is selected from the choice set of ʻc’ by ʻa’. So 
ʻwc’ is the world of evaluation of ⟦ϕ⟧c when it is assessed from ʻa’, but ⟦might ϕ⟧c,w
c 
yields the 
empty set, since ʻwc’ has not fixed value in ʻc’. 
(13) presupposes that the truth-conditional status of might-sentences is determined 
systematically by the semantic effects of ʻa’, but it also allows for exceptional cases where ʻa’ 
is semantically inert. One such example is the following: 
 
(14) a. Bonnie: The keys might be on the kitchen table. 
b. Clyde [to Buck]: Bonnie said that the keys might be on the kitchen table. 
 
The context of assessment of (14a) is (14b), but Clyde seems to remain completely neutral 
with regard to the truth-value of Bonnie’s claim. He simply reports what Bonnie said. If so, 
(14b) has no effect on the truth-conditional status of (14a). Then the embedded might-
sentence in (14b) is to be thought of as neither true nor false. This might be a bit puzzling at 
first sight, since Clyde’s report is obviously true. 
Fortunately, the appearance is deceptive, for there is no essential inconsistency here. One 
may grant that the might-sentence inside the that-clause in (14b) does not express a truth-
evaluable content, without denying that it expresses a proposition at all. And one can further 
argue that a said that construction requires only that the embedded sentence expresses a 
proposition. This is sufficient to block the envisaged problem. Clyde’s report is true, because 
its that-clause expresses exactly the same proposition as was expressed by Bonnie’s original 
claim. 
The situation would not be significantly altered if ʻsaid’ were replaced in (14b) with 
ʻbelieves’ or ʻthinks’ or other attitude verbs. I conjecture that all of these cases could be 
accounted for by the same pattern of explanation. Hence the existence of semantically inert 
contexts of assessment does not present any special problem for the view outlined in this 
section. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Adherents of non-truth-conditional and relativist frameworks have recently offered competing 
but equally plausible analyses of epistemic modal discourse. I think that a careful integration 
of these frameworks could provide a further advancement in this domain of research. In order 
to succeed in integrating non-truth-conditional and relativist views, one must jointly accept 
both that might-sentences do not have truth-evaluable content in their contexts of occurrence, 
and that it is always the context of assessment that determines whether such sentences are true 
or false. The present paper attempted to show that such a stance can be articulated without 
falling into contradiction. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. I am assuming here that the interpretation function ⟦ ⟧ suitable for interpreting the meaning of epistemic 
modals is singly relative, that is, it comprises a non-empty modal base and an empty ordering source. Cf. the 
relevant remarks of Kratzer (1991) and Werner (2011). 
 
2. As far as I know, this metatheoretical observation was first made by Yalcin (2011). 
 
3. (3) can be conceived here as an epistemic sentence in the sense that it expresses what the speaker believes (or 
knows) to be true with respect to the whereabouts of the key. 
 
4. Dynamic semanticists are not always explicit in what they take to be the significance of the effects of the 
quantifiers. For example, Fintel and Gillies (2007) claim that ʻmight’ serves to comment that the prejacent is 
compatible what is known by a given group of speakers. But it is not entirely clear how to specify precisely such 
kind of comments at the level of semantic content. 
 
5. It should be noted that thesis (i) does not have a fixed place in the expressivist framework. Sometimes the 
same author seems to oscillate between different conceptions. For example, while Yalcin (2007) argues 
explicitly for thesis (i), Yalcin (2011) remains silent on all issues concerning the quantificational nature of 
epistemic modals. 
 
6. There is a wide consensus in the relevant literature that the cognitive state ʻleaving-open that p’ means that 
one does not know that ʻnot-p’ is the case. I think it is only the half of the truth. ʻLeaving-open that p’ means two 
things at once: first that one does not know that ʻnot-p’ is the case, but also that one leaves-open that ʻnot-p’. 
Without the latter, it would be quite unreasonable to leave-open that ʻp’. There is much more to be said about the 
real cognitive basis of epistemic modals, but this is a complicated topic which has to be left for another occasion.  
 
7. For more details on this issue, see Yalcin (2011). 
 
8. The case of negation is mentioned here because it poses an additional question. One might object that the 
demonstrative ʻThat’ in (8c) refers only to the prejacent of (7), and so the modal auxiliary does not belong to the 
scope of negation. I think the plausibility of this objection depends on what one thinks about the semantic of 
demonstratives. If one holds that the reference of ʻThat’ in (8c) is determined by Bonnie’s intention, then there 
are two possibilities: Bonnie can either deny that the keys are in the car, or she can deny that the keys are 
possibly in the car. In the latter case, ʻThat’ refers to (7), and so the entire sentence falls under the scope of 
negation. 
 
9. Schroeder (2013) proposes a different strategy for expressivists. According to his view, in order to offer a 
better explanation or understanding of compositional phenomena, expressivists should make an attempt to 
redefine the notion of proposition. This is a proposal which could be further explored, but I think that one can 
provide a less radical solution to the problem at hand. See Section 4 below. 
 
10. Semantic relativism is a cluster of views according to which the features of the context of assessment play a 
crucial role in the determination of the truth values of sentences. I will use the label ʻrelativism’ here only to 
refer to theories that relativize truth values to the world parameter of the context of assessment. For other 
versions of relativism, see Egan (2011). 
 
11. MacFarlane takes these data as direct evidence for his relativist semantic theory. It is worthy of note, 
however, that the evidential relation between linguistic data and semantic hypotheses is much more complicated 
than MacFarlane suggests. On this important topic, see Kertész and Rákosi (2012). 
 
12. Kaplan (1989, 584–585). 
 
13. Of course, one can doubt the existence of such propositions for several reasons. But I think it is not at all 
implausible to suppose that there are such propositions. 
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